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I. Introduction 
The U.S. health system has the health privacy system it deserves. It is 
fragmented, based on regulatory technicalities rather than principle, and is 
frequently exploited by rent-seekers. Suppose, however, the U.S. health 
system evolved or was changed into a system designed not around 
individualism (or individual choice) but solidarity.
1
 Would that change 
enable a recalibrated health privacy system? What could it look like, and 
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 1. Health solidarity argues that ill health is a social cost and therefore should be borne 
by all through (typically) a universal system of care. Solidarity (or health equity) often is 
viewed as oppositional to the American value of individualism See generally William M. 
Sage, Solidarity: Unfashionable, but Still American, in HASTINGS CTR., CONNECTING 
AMERICAN VALUES WITH HEALTH REFORM 10 (Mary Crowley ed., 2009); Lindsay F. Wiley, 
From Patient Rights to Health Justice, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833 (2016). 
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would that somewhat relaxed health privacy system itself improve the 
health system, thereby completing a virtuous circle? 
At the outset, we emphasize that this Article is not a thinly veiled attempt 
at reducing or removing health privacy protections. Health data, because of 
their psychological and emotional implications, particular sensitivity, and 
potential for enabling stigma and discrimination, deserve exceptional 
protection. Rather, we posit a thought experiment, examining how health 
care and health privacy could evolve together, benefiting both. 
The core proposition that we advance is that there is (or should be) a 
hydraulic relationship between healthcare and health privacy, that is as 
healthcare access increases, the need for health privacy will decrease (and 
vice versa). First, if health care continues to robustly prohibit health 
discrimination and continues to grow closer to universal access, the need 
for health data protection should decrease. This decrease would result not 
because privacy declines as a value but because exposures of health 
information would be less consequential. Second, it is broadly accepted that 
the United States imprudently spends a considerably larger percentage of its 
“health dollars” on clinical health rather than public health. The outsized 
role of social determinants, zip-code health, and institutionalized health 
inequities have been accentuated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Public 
health recognizes solidarity (social and health interdependence) as a 
fundamental tenet. As the recovery from COVID-19 begins and we “build 
back better,”
2
 public health (and hence, solidarity) likely will be 
strengthened. Third, the movements towards universal access and more 
vibrant public health are likely to be premised on a shift away from health 
individualism to solidarity. As this shift slowly develops, it is likely to 
engender more sharing of personal information in order to improve the 
overall health of the population. 
In summary, the hydraulic relationship we posit is that if health care 
continues to robustly prohibit health discrimination and continues to grow 
closer to universal access, the need for health data protection should 
decrease.  We further suggest that this could be part of unlocking the puzzle 
of clinical and public health being slowed by individualism holding sway 
over solidarity; if the consequences of data exposure are reduced, this 
should encourage further sharing of data and overall system improvement. 
                                                                                                             
 2. WHITE HOUSE, BUILD BACK BETTER (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/build-
back-better/ (detailing President Biden’s three-part plan to rebuild the American economy 
following the COVID-19 pandemic). 
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II. Relating Health Privacy to Health Care 
Data laws impacting healthcare lack theoretical integration into the 
broader space of U.S. healthcare law and policy. They may be taught in 
health law classes but are often treated as outliers (“class, we may not reach 
the end of the syllabus and be able to discuss HIPAA
3
”). While data laws 
were given a seat with older, relationship-based health law such as tort 
duties, they are not seen as a crucial part of the modern healthcare 
regulatory system and are viewed only from a distance when healthcare 
history and policy are discussed. However, in this Article, we argue that our 
healthcare data laws have a closer relationship to the healthcare law 
mothership than is often portrayed (and that is not necessarily a 
compliment).  
Both healthcare and healthcare data protection are essentially accidental 
systems, in large part because policymakers committed “original sins” from 
which the two systems have never recovered.
4
  
Our healthcare system is a public-private hybrid whose Frankensteinian 
properties are exacerbated every day that passes without us pushing the 
“pause” button and tackling foundational questions. As Abbe Gluck puts it, 
“Congress should be debating . . . whether health care falls into the category 
of goods that individuals should either acquire on their own or go without. 




U.S. healthcare data laws suffer from a similar lack of intellectual focus. 
Policymakers, from the President, to Congress, to the Supreme Court, punt 
on the core issue of our privacy rights, and mouth platitudes about how 
important privacy is, while skirmishing over minor issues
6
 such as whether 
your cable company must ask before it sells your browsing history.
7
 
                                                                                                             
 3. HIPAA refers to the Privacy and Security Rules, 45 C.F.R. Part 160 and Part 164, 
Subparts A, C and E made pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) 
 4. Nicolas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data 
Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 143, 149 (2017) [hereinafter Terry, 
Regulatory Disruption]; see also Nicolas P. Terry, Structural Determinism Amplifying the 
Opioid Crisis: It’s the Healthcare, Stupid!, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 315, 330 (2019). 
 5. Abbe Gluck, America Needs to Decide: Is Health Care Something We Owe Our 
Citizens?, VOX (Mar. 18, 2017, 9:36 AM EDT), http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/ 
3/6/14826974/health-care-aca-philosophy-republican-obamacare (emphasis omitted).  
 6. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 168.  
 7. See Sarah Krouse & Patience Haggin, Internet Providers Look to Cash in on Your 
Web Habits, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2019, 5:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
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A. Privatized Health Care and Underregulated Health Privacy 
In the absence of fundamental or foundational principles to build on, our 
data laws lack paths to develop ahead or in conjunction with growing 
threats. Notwithstanding, some government actors have stepped up to the 
plate. The Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights 
(HHS-OCR) has been increasingly effective in enforcing the HIPAA 
Security and Privacy rules.
8
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
trained its sights on healthcare,
9
 and as Daniel Solove and Woodrow 
Hartzog concluded, the “FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is functionally 
equivalent to a body of common law” and the “FTC’s privacy jurisprudence 
is quite thick.”
10
 Admirable, yes, but such common-law case-by-case 
analogues tend to be quite inefficient. 
Worse, given the lack of political consensus regarding increased data 
protection outside of conventional healthcare, our data protection becomes 
more dependent on private actors and soft regulation—for example, app 
stores policing mobile medical apps, or famously weak industry codes of 
conduct.
11
 Even those private actors are at war among themselves as the 
recent spat between Facebook and Apple over the latter’s increased 
transparency rules resulted in public rebukes from the former.
12
 
Mothership healthcare policymakers also are enamored of the private 
sector. Lacking a big reset button, they rely on market approximating 
policies trotted out as though the late Kenneth Arrow never spent time on 
this planet.
13
 Rather than adopting a public option to private programs, they 
                                                                                                             
facebook-knows-a-lot-about-you-so-does-your-internet-provider-11561627803 (discussing 
privacy concerns about how companies use consumer data and why the FTC asked internet-
service providers to explain their data-privacy policies).  
 8. Cf. Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 203. 
 9. See, e.g., MARKUS H. MEISER ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FTC 
ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1 (2019).  
 10. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2014). 
 11. See Casey Ross & Erin Brodwin, Hospitals Turn to Big Tech Companies to Store 
and Analyze Their Data — Leaving Patients in the Dark on Privacy Protections, STAT (Mar. 
12, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/12/hospitals-big-tech-store-analyze-data-
privacy/. 
 12. See, e.g., Dipayan Ghosh, Nice Try, Facebook. iOS Changes Aren’t Bad for Small 
Businesses, WIRED (Dec. 24, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/sorry-facebook-
ios-changes-not-bad-for-small-businesses/ (discussing how Facebook criticized Apple’s iOS 
14, which gave users the choice to ban data tracking and established a more protective data-
privacy policy, for allegedly being too unfair to small businesses).  
 13. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss1/4
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spend their days adding private options to public programs.
14
 As if 
Elizabethan poor laws-inspired drug-testing and work requirements are not 
enough, they want our Medicaid populations to open health accounts and, 




Although dwindling in their frequency, there are still claims that the 
United States has “the best health care delivery system in the world.”
16
 
However, that proposition is exploded by basic comparisons with other 
healthcare systems:
17
 first, on outright quality metrics, and second, even 
more seriously when judged on cost-effectiveness based on expended 
percentages of GDP.
18
 The flawed response to the pandemic and the 
resulting exorbitant death rate in the United States have served as stark 
reality checks that private health care entities lack incentives “to invest in 
healthcare solidarity to achieve herd-based improvements to the health of 
all.”
19
 Similarly, it has been fashionable to claim that U.S. data laws were 
groundbreaking and ahead of other countries. If that was ever true, it was 
                                                                                                             
53(5) THE AM. ECONOMIC REV. 53, 941–73 (1963), http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812044. See 
generally Steven Durlauf, Kenneth Arrow and the Golden Age of Economic Theory, VOXEU 
(Apr. 8, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/ideas-kenneth-arrow. 
 14. See, e.g., Mark Miller, When Medicare Choices Get ‘Pretty Crazy,’ Many Seniors 
Avert Their Eyes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/ 
business/medicare-advantage-retirement.html (discussing Medicare and how it has 
undergone greater privatization since the 1990s, notably with Medicare Part D for 
prescription drug coverage). 
 15. See generally Elizabeth Hinton et al., 10 Things to Know About Medicaid Managed 
Care, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/10-
things-to-know-about-medicaid-managed-care/ (discussing state Medicaid programs). For a 
more in-depth critique of Medicaid programs, Medicaid expansion under the Affordable 
Care Act, and state work requirements for Medicaid programs, see Nicolas P. Terry, 
Medicaid and Opioids: From Promising Present to Perilous Future, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 
867–78 (2020) [hereinafter Terry, Medicaid and Opioids].  
 16. See, e.g., “Face the Nation” Transcripts, July 1, 2012: Speaker Boehner, Senators 
Schumer and Coburn, Governors Walker and O’Malley, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2012, 2:55 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-july-1-2012-speaker-boehner-
senators-schumer-and-coburn-governors-walker-and-omalley/. 
 17. See, e.g., Roosa Tikkanen & Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Care from a Global 
Perspective, 2019: Higher Spending, Worse Outcomes?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 30, 
2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-
care-global-perspective-2019. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Nicolas Terry, COVID-19 and Healthcare Lessons Already Learned, 7 J.L. & 
BIOSCIENCES, May 2020, at 10 [hereinafter Terry, Covid-19 Lessons]. 
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revealed as a myth when Warren and Brandeis’s foundational “The Right to 
Privacy”
20
 wound up and down an intentional torts cul-de-sac.
21
 
Privatization also leads to the corruption of privacy as bad actors use it to 
create proprietary data silos, either to monetize the data directly or, in the 
case of healthcare providers, to protect other networks from competing for 
their patients.
22
 Policymakers have responded by disfavoring such 
“information blocking” and favoring patient data liquidity.
23
 However, 
there is still too much friction in the system. This friction is proving a major 
impediment to increasing care coordination that depends on longitudinal 
rather than episodic models of care.
24
 Equally, broader incorporation of 
socio-demographic data necessary to combat social determinants must see 
health care privacy embracing public health models (that lean towards 
solidarity) and require broad data access and sharing. 
  
                                                                                                             
 20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). This 1890 article was influenced, in part, by technological advances within the 
second half of the nineteenth century, such as the camera. Brandeis and Warren identified 
four types of harms that were based on the “right to be let alone” and recognized that 
generally one’s private matters are to be protected from publication. See, e.g., Bruce E. 
Boyden, Regulating at the End of Privacy, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 173, 226. 
 21. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 148 (“Today, the article’s ‘Right 
to Privacy’ title plays better than its substance and, perversely, that title now exists merely as 
a slogan inaccurately preserving the myth of strong U.S. data protection.”). 
 22. Privacy advocates have expressed concerns about private actors profiting off of and 
selling individuals’ health data, more commonly known as “data mining.” See, e.g., Kirsten 
Ostherr, Telehealth Overpromises During the Covid-19 Pandemic, STAT (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/19/telehealth-overpromises-during-the-covid-19-
pandemic/ (expressing concerns about big tech companies storing individuals’ health data). 
Moreover, privacy concerns about data mining have become a bigger issue in recent years. 
See, e.g., Melanie Evans, Hospitals Give Tech Giants Access to Detailed Medical Records, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2020, 5:30 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hospitals-give-tech-
giants-access-to-detailed-medical-records-11579516200. 
 23. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 and other scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also 
Information Blocking and the ONC Health IT Certification Program: Extension of 
Compliance Dates and Timeframes in Response to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, 
85 Fed. Reg. 70064 (Nov. 4, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 170, 171).  
 24. See, e.g., Proposed Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support, and 
Remove Barriers to, Coordinated Care and Individual Engagement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-ocr-hipaa-
nprm.pdf (strengthening HIPAA patient access and improving information sharing for care 
coordination and case management). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss1/4
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B. Original Sins and Fragmentation 
These accidental and incoherent systems were both the product of 
“original sins.”
25
 Elisabeth Rosenthal argues that “[t]he very idea of health 
insurance is in some ways the original sin that catalyzed the evolution of 
today’s medical-industrial complex.”
26
 An even more likely candidate for 
the original transgression was the insertion of the employer into the 
provision of access to healthcare. Post-World War II, government price 
controls and favorable Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rulings saw 
participation in employer-provided plans rise sevenfold between 1940 and 
1953, to eventually cover over sixty percent of the population.
27
 What 
should have happened thereafter was a transition to a national health 
insurance model. What actually happened was a two-tier system of 
healthcare access based on employment status. From 1965 to 2010, 
politically charged government interventions followed, providing insurance 
to increasingly narrow slices of the population based on the federal poverty 
level, disability, age, and so on.
28
 
The orthogonal data protection sin was the Privacy Act of 1974,
29
 passed 
in the aftermath of Watergate. A 1973 Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare advisory commission had recommended a comprehensive 
privacy law.
30
 Instead, Congress enacted privacy legislation to control only 
the data collecting practices of the federal government.
31
  
Those original sins begat fragmentation. The United States barely has a 
healthcare “system,” instead surviving on a stew featuring a little Bismarck, 
                                                                                                             
 25. Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 149. Likewise, Frank Pasquale calls the 
“original sin” of American privacy law the failure to embrace a comprehensive rather than 
piecemeal approach to data protection. See id. (citing Episode 7: Mark Rothstein, Big Data & 
Health Research, Apple ResearchKit, White House Consumer Privacy Bill, WK. HEALTH L. 
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://twihl.podbean.com/e/7-mark-rothstein-big-data-health-research-apple-
reserachkit-white-house-consumer-privacy-bill/ [https://perma.cc/LQ48-W2RL]).  
 26. ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG 
BUSINESS AND HOW YOU CAN TAKE IT BACK 14 (2017). 
 27. Alex Blumberg & Adam Davidson, Accidents of History Created U.S. Health 
System, NPR (Oct. 22, 2009, 3:28 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=114045132. 
 28. See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare for?, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1708–19 (2018).  
 29. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 552a).  
 30. See generally U.S. DEP’T HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS) 73–94, 
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).  
 31. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a.  
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a dash of Beveridge, some Canada, and still too much sub-Saharan Africa.
32
 
Indeed, the most difficult task is cataloging the different types of 
fragmentation; they include, for example, resource allocation (e.g., public 
health versus clinical care, downstream to patients rather than upstream to 
pre-patients), funding streams, insurance markets, lack of coordination in 
patient care, and so on.
33
  
U.S. data protection also exhibits chronic fragmentation.
34
 A 
comprehensive data protection law is multifaceted across both horizontal 
and vertical dimensions. Horizontally, it should apply to all sectors of the 
economy. Vertically, it should feature Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs)
35
—like protective standards throughout the data lifecycle: creation 
through destruction. Upstream protections should include data minimization 
and context or purpose limitations on data collection. Downstream, where 
data is processed and disclosed, the law should require (at the least) quality, 
security, integrity, and confidentiality limitations. And, of course, data 
subjects should be given access, correction, use, and erasure rights, while 




                                                                                                             
 32. See generally INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS (Roosa Tikkanen 
et al. eds., 2020).  
 33. See Terry, COVID-19 Lessons, supra note 19, at 10–11 (discussing the United 
States’ fragmented health care system and how it has impacted the response to the COVID-
19 pandemic).  
 34. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809) (imposing data protection requirements 
on financial institutions); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x) (governing the collection and use 
of information and its effects on consumers’ creditworthiness); Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat. 1955, 2005 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491–5603) (providing authority to take action to prevent a 
“covered person” from “committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or 
practice”). 
 35. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) developed these core privacy principles or 
FIPPS that include the following: “(1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) 
Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.” Terry, 
Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 148 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: 
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998)). 
 36. Compare, for instance, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) which recognizes health data privacy as a fundamental right. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32. 
Instead of governing data privacy based on how and where the information was received, the 
GDPR favors strong personal data uniform protections. See id. There is a presumption 
against data collection, and data can only be collected if one of six exceptions applies. 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 36; see also Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection, 26 MICH. TECH. L. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss1/4
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In contrast to such an ideal, U.S. data laws lack both horizontal and 
vertical comprehensive characteristics. On the horizontal axis, our data laws 
are split by domain or sector, so healthcare has a different data law 
compared to, say, financial services.
37
 On the vertical axis, our data laws 
almost exclusively favor downstream models, protecting some 
dissemination but seldom inhibiting collection.
38
 
Of course, HIPAA is illustrative of both limitations; vertically, it applies 
only to healthcare, and horizontally, it provides only downstream 
protections (confidentiality, security, and breach notification).
39
 However, 
HIPAA is at the root of more serious fragmentation because of its relatively 
narrow application. Rather than applying to healthcare data generally, it 
applies to an increasingly narrow group of data custodians, primarily 
“covered entities.”
40
 If there was truth in advertising, the “HIPAA privacy 




                                                                                                             
REV. 229, 237 (2020) (discussing the European Union privacy-protection framework). 
Another more comprehensive privacy model making waves is the California Consumer 
Privacy Act (CCPA). CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (2021). The CCPA 
defines personal data more expansively than the European Union’s GDPR does. Compare id. 
§ 1798.140(v)(1) (defining personal data as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, 
is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or 
indirectly, with a particular consumer or household”), with 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (defining 
personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”). 
Although controversial, the CCPA has sparked a debate at the state level. Some states, such 
as Nevada, Maine, Virginia, and Colorado have passed their own data privacy laws in the 
wake of the CCPA. See e.g., Kayvan Alikhani, California’s CCPA Triggers a Tsunami of 
State-Level Data Privacy Laws, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:45 AM EST), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/02/20/californias-ccpa-triggers-a-tsunami-of-state-
level-data-privacy-laws/?sh=63cafde76cad.  
 37. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 150 (“[S]ectoral models 
inevitably encourage differential levels of protection, and that more often promotes a race to 
the bottom rather than to the top. Worse, high levels of protection can be characterized as 
outliers and targeted for ‘reform.’”). 
 38. Nicolas P. Terry, Assessing the Thin Regulation of Consumer-Facing Health 
Technologies, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94, 95 (2020). 
 39. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 155. 
 40. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–160.103 (2020).  
 41. For a more in-depth discussion, see Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 
162. While the HITECH Act of 2009 expanded HIPAA’s reach to business associates, the 
protection provided to health data remains relatively narrow. See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, § 13401, 123 Stat. 226, 260 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.).  
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Self-evidently, data held by data custodians other than covered entities or 
by the data subject lack HIPAA protection. This omission results in 
problems as we seek to protect data held in or by mobile devices,
42
 fitness 
bands, big data brokers, the Internet of Things—and the list keeps 
growing.
43
 Unfortunately, healthcare data protection exhibits far deeper 
fragmentation than is caused by HIPAA’s narrow verticality. Even within 
HIPAA things get complicated. For example, process notes taken by 
psychotherapists are viewed as personal notes and the Privacy Rule 
therefore likely exempts most from the rule’s patient access and healthcare 
provider disclosure provisions.
44
 Meanwhile, there has been an increase in 
use of personal data (that previously would not have been considered health 
data) by some HIPAA covered entities, who now rely on “health plan 
prediction models” based on consumer data such as “income, marital status, 




Outside of HIPAA, there is even more health care data protection 
fragmentation. For example, Title II of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) applies an upstream (collection) 
data protection rule to certain genetic information.
46
 Regulations 
promulgated under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 
police some employer wellness plans.
47
 And (at least until recently)
48
 the 
Substance Abuse Confidentiality Regulations (often referred to by their 
citation, “42 C.F.R. Part 2”) promulgated under the Drug Abuse Office and 
                                                                                                             
 42. See Resources for Mobile Health Apps Developers, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/health-
apps/index.html. 
 43. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 194; see also Mark A. Rothstein 
et al., Unregulated Health Research Using Mobile Devices: Ethical Considerations and 
Policy Recommendations, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196, 196 (2020). 
 44. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2020); see also Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
privacy/laws-regulations/index.html.  
 45. Kirk J. Nahra, Healthcare in the National Privacy Law Debate, AM. BAR ASS’N 
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/health_law/publications/aba_health_ 
esource/2019-2020/december-2019/healthcare-debate/ (citing Natasha Singer, When a 
Health Plan Knows How You Shop, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/06/29/technology/when-a-health-plan-knows-how-you-shop.html [https://perma. 
cc/HCP6-HGD8]) . 
 46. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(1).  
 47. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (2020).  
 48. See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
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Treatment Act of 1972
49
 applied, in addition to HIPAA, to federally 
assisted programs that maintain alcohol and substance use patient records. 
C. Uneasy Federalism 
Our healthcare system and data protection rules share another trait, what 
could be described as uneasy federalism, as neither our federal or state 
governments fully agree as to either policy or implementation. The 
healthcare federalism built on top of our federal system of government has 
resulted in a dizzying array of actors, sources of finance, and 
reimbursement models that have created different rules governing access, 
benefits, out-of-pocket expenses, and so on for different segments of the 
population.
50
 Both holdings in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius
51
 reflected how far the United States is from a national 
healthcare system; the Court deemed the Commerce Clause unable to 
sustain the individual mandate, while states’ rights prevailed and upset 
Medicaid expansion.
52
 Once again, where Americans lived was likely to 
determine their access to healthcare.
53
  
Beyond constitutional restraints, the primary cause of this uneasy 
federalism is that the federal government has little or no interest—or 
apparent ability—to design or implement a health care system.
54
 Its 
competence begins and ends with financing the endeavors of others which, 
in some cases, it also regulates. Those “others” are the states and frequently 
rent-seeking private actors, including health insurers and large health care 
providers. Medicare may be a national program but, while nationally 
financed, it primarily depends on implementation by the private sector and 
state regulators.
55
 Similarly, the majority of Medicaid funding comes from 
                                                                                                             
 49. Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 65 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3). 
 50. See Terry, Covid-19 Lessons, supra note 19, at 3.  
 51. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
 52. Id. at 588. 
 53. Terry, Covid-19 Lessons, supra note 19, at 4; see also Rachel Garfield et al., The 
Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States That Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-
uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/. 
 54. See generally Nicolas Terry, From Health Policy to Stigma and Back Again: The 
Feedback Loop Perpetuating the Opioids Crisis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 785, 788 (discussing 
the lack of a “coherent national health policy” to combat the opioid crisis in the United 
States).  
 55. See Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: How Does It Work and 
What Are the Implications?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-how-does-it-work-and-what-are-the-implications/. 
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the federal government, particularly in the case of Medicaid expansion’s 
enhanced match.
56
 Though some federal regulatory guardrails exist, it is the 
states who, by contract with the federal government, design and implement 
their plans (again, primarily using private actors).
57
 Further, it is clear that 
one national political party subscribes to the policy of reducing those who 
benefit from Medicaid either by implementing work requirements or 
forcing states to reduce access by moving the financing model to one of 
block grants.
58
 As for claims from the right that the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) was a federal government takeover of health care,
59
 the most that 
should be conceded is that it was a dramatic expansion of federal health 
insurance regulation. Tragically, COVID-19 illustrated that the federal 
government’s disinterest in implementing a national clinical care strategy 
extended to public health. From managing shortages of Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) and ventilators, to testing, and failing to implement a 
workable plan for the vaccine roll-out, the federal government acted as 
though the Tenth Amendment was simply a policy directive to avoid 
meaningful cooperation.
60
 For example, the federal government was unable 
to replicate the early successes of vaccine development with a workable 
plan for states to accomplish actual vaccinations.
61
 
Data protection fares no better. Doctrinally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule is 
an example of cooperative federalism.
62
 While it preempts, it also permits 
federal law to defer to some state laws—in particular, those that offer more 
stringent
63
 protection for patient data.
64
 So, for example, one state’s privacy 
                                                                                                             
 56. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 2001(a)(3)(B)(y), 124 Stat. 119, 272 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. ch. 157). 
 57. See Snyder & Rudowitz, supra note 55. 
 58. See, e.g., Terry, Medicaid and Opioids, supra note 15, at 882–83 (discussing how 
fiscal conservatives have attempted to use a block-grant framework for Medicaid).  
 59. See Bill Keller, Five Obamacare Myths, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2012), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/07/16/opinion/keller-five-obamacare-myths.html. 
 60. See generally PUB. L. HEALTH WATCH, ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 
(Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020). 
 61. See, e.g., Dan Diamond, The Crash Landing of ‘Operation Warp Speed’, POLITICO 
(Jan. 17, 2021, 7:00 AM EST), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/17/crash-landing-of-
operation-warp-speed-459892.  
 62. Under a cooperative federalism framework, there is an overlapping of 
responsibilities between the federal and state governments. See Mary Hallock Morris, 
Cooperative Federalism, CTR. FOR STUDY FEDERALISM, https://encyclopedia.federalism.org/ 
index.php/Cooperative_Federalism (last visited May 28, 2021).  
 63. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1)–(6) (2020).  
 64. See id. § 160.203. This generally occurs with three types of state laws: (1) laws that 
grant individuals more privacy protections or rights to their health information; (2) laws 
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law may require that a psychologist obtain a patient’s consent to disclose 
medical records over and above HIPAA requirements.
65
 Cooperative 
federalism thus enables states to be innovative and to provide greater 
privacy protections for persons with medical or psychological conditions 
associated with social or economic impact.
66
 But, because state privacy law 
was developed haphazardly, and is subject to continual developments in 
related areas (such as reporting requirements, licensure, and certification), 
the partial preemptive framework of cooperative federalism is confusing, 
burdensome, and costly for many stakeholders.
67 
III. Healthcare and Healthcare Privacy Hydraulics 
Both healthcare and healthcare data protection are flawed. Indeed, to an 
extent, they deserve each other. Both have also been the subject of 
voluminous but unrelated reform proposals. Suppose, however, that we use 
a different lens through which healthcare and healthcare data protection are 
seen, one in which they exist in more of a hydraulic relationship. 
Specifically, we should consider whether, as healthcare protections 
increase, healthcare data protection should become less stringent or vice 
versa. The culmination of the former process would be the re-engineering 
of the U.S. healthcare system as one rotating around solidarity rather than 
individualism. If that process was ever completed, it could justifiably lead 
to a recalibration of health data protection—a new model that concentrates 
less on protecting individual slivers of personal data and more on enabling 
responsible flows of health data. Subsequently, as the health data protection 
system increasingly is re-purposed to improve the health system, it would 
complete a virtuous circle. 
                                                                                                             
creating reporting requirements, such as those for disease, injury, child abuse, or public 
health surveillance; (3) laws that require health plans to report or provide access to 
information for financial audits, program monitoring, or licensure or certification. See id. § 
160.203(b)–(d). In addition, the HHS Secretary can grant a state’s request for non-
preemption for certain reasons, including where the Secretary finds the state law serves a 
compelling need related to public health, safety, and welfare. See id. § 160.203(a)(1)–(2).  
 65. See Jennifer Daw Holloway, What Takes Precedence: HIPAA or State Law?, AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Jan. 3, 2003), https://www.apa.org/monitor/jan03/hipaa. 
 66. See Grace Ko, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 522 (2006).  
 67. Id. at 507–08; see also Jennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out–The Burdens and 
Challenges of HIPAA Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the “Minimum 
Necessary” Standard, and the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 157 
(2003).  
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There are several logical ancillaries to this thought experiment, and some 
are speculative or for some other reason difficult to establish. For example: 
Is there evidence that healthcare data protection has inhibited clinical or 
public health data collection and analysis; in other words, does solidarity-
based public health pay a privacy “tax” for its data? 
Equally, how could we validate or measure an increase in the level of 
clinical and public health research to justify the removal of the privacy tax? 
Would increased solidarity in clinical and public health create a societal 
or policy environment whereby data subjects would be in favor of the 
recalibration of healthcare data protection? 
Is there a political route for the United States to establish clinical care 
solidarity, meaning a scenario whereby not only would all persons have 
access to healthcare (universalism) but also all cohorts would have access 
to the same healthcare system without today’s segmentation based on 
reimbursement, etc.? 
Could sufficient trust in solidarity health be built using legal tools such 
as antidiscrimination rules which render bad actors’ misuse of data less 
consequential such that lower levels of data protection would be palatable? 
If this thought experiment were to evolve into policy, then we would 
need to grapple with each of these questions and more. As explained above, 
however, we are far from the goals of this thought experiment. The U.S. 
healthcare system and health privacy systems operate in separate domains 
that have been subject to numerous, unsuccessful reform efforts, resulting 
in both systems remaining fragmented, overly complex, and 
underperforming. But all is not lost. Hiding in plain sight are several 
examples of successful shifts or recalibrations toward solidarity principles. 
These examples justify the hydraulic hypothesis and may help shine a light 
on the path forward. 
A. ACA, GINA, and Pre-Existing Conditions 
The relationship between the ACA’s prohibitions of health 
discrimination and GINA
68
 provides not an example of an actual hydraulic 
relationship, but more of a “what could have been” scenario. 
GINA utilizes two types of data protection to safeguard against 
discrimination based on genetic test results. First, GINA prohibits 
downstream point of use discrimination by health insurers (Title I)
69
 and 
                                                                                                             
 68. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 69. Id. §§ 101–106. 
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 Second, GINA prohibits the requiring or (in many 
cases) acquiring of genetic information.
71
 The latter is an example of 
upstream (collection-centric) protection.
72
 As Bradley Areheart and Jessica 
Roberts note, by using an upstream model that prohibits the collection of 
genetic data, GINA has acted “more as a protection against invasions of 
privacy than as a protection against discrimination,”
73
 although in practice it 
did both. 
In contrast, the ACA works to improve clinical care and promote public 
health by prohibiting health insurance discrimination based on health status, 
essentially by outlawing medical underwriting.
74
 The ACA has now 
survived its third existential encounter with the Supreme Court
75
 and 
increasingly seems immune to serious challenges in either judicial or 
political spheres. However, in the future, if the ACA was invalidated or 
repealed, the revocation of the prohibition on medical underwriting would 
be only one of the many tragedies for public health. While some limited 
genetic data regarding genetic susceptibility may still be protected under 
GINA, any evidence of “manifest disease” could subject individuals to 




Leaving aside that existential threat, the ACA has removed the ability for 
individual market insurers to deny coverage to or overcharge
77
 the 
54,000,000 non-elderly Americans with pre-existing conditions who would 
find themselves uninsurable in the individual marketplace if they were laid 
off and lost health benefits.
78
 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. §§ 201–213. 
 71. See, e.g., id. § 101(b)(d)(1) (prohibiting, in general, health insurers from requiring, 
requesting, or purchasing genetic information for purposes of underwriting); id. § 202(b) 
(prohibiting, in general, employers from requiring, requesting, or purchasing genetic 
information about an employee).  
 72. See Terry, Regulatory Disruption, supra note 4, at 172. 
 73. Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of 
Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 714 (2019). 
 74. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1 to -7. 
 75. See California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021). 
 76. See Reed Abelson & Abby Goodnough, If the Supreme Court Ends Obamacare, 
Here’s What It Would Mean, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ 
supreme-court-obamacare-case.html.  
 77. Id. 
 78. See Gary Claxton et al., Pre-Existing Condition Prevalence for Individuals and 
Families, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/pre-
existing-condition-prevalance-for-individuals-and-families/; Karen Pollitz, Pre-Existing 
Conditions: What Are They and How Many People Have Them?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 
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Suppose, however, the ACA and its prohibitions on health discrimination 
had existed prior to the Human Genome Project. Would (in very general 
terms) Title II of GINA still have been necessary? Simply stated, if the 
benefits to insurers from having access to genetic data on which to base 
their medical underwriting had not existed, would their incentives to 
acquire such data have evaporated along with the necessity for genetic 
privacy? There are other reasons why genetic data should be protected and, 
no doubt, rent seekers such as big data brokers would have continued to 
collect data to sell to customers other than health insurers. Notwithstanding, 
the hydraulic point is theoretically valid; if health law and policy reduces 
the likelihood of discriminatory or other worrying uses of health data, then 
less health data protection may be possible. Equally, if discrimination is re-
enabled as it was during the Trump Administration’s recent assault of the 
ACA’s section 1557 nondiscrimination protections,
79
 arguably additional 
data protection would be necessary. 
B. Public Health, HIPAA, and Waivers 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule describes a relatively cozy relationship 
between healthcare entities holding protected health information (PHI) and 
federal, state, and tribal public health authorities (PHAs).
80
 Covered entities 
may disclose such information to those authorities
81
 subject to the minimum 
necessary standard.
82
 A 2020 HHS-OCR guidance further detailed how 
Health Information Exchanges (HIEs), typically acting as business 
associates,
83
 may be used as conduits in such data transfers.
84
 
                                                                                                             
1, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/pre-existing-conditions-what-are-they-and-how-
many-people-have-them/.  
 79. See generally Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or 
Activities, Delegation of Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37160 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460 and 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156) (significantly narrowing 
the scope of section 1557 by limiting nondiscrimination protections to individuals 
participating in health programs or activities receiving HHS funding, programs or activities 
administered by HHS under Title I of the ACA, and health insurance marketplaces and 
insurance plans participating in such marketplaces); see also Walker v. Azar, 480 F. Supp. 
3d 417, 429–30 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (striking down some of the Trump Administration’s rules 
removing antidiscrimination provisions made by the Obama Administration pursuant to 
section 1557 of the ACA).  
 80. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–160.316 (2020); id. §§ 164.102–164.106; id. §§ 
164.500–164.534. 
 81. See id. § 164.512.  
 82. See id. § 164.514(d)(3). 
 83. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; see also id. §§ 164.502(e), 164.504(e), 164.532(d)–(e). 
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The hydraulic nature of this relationship is illustrated by how the 
relationship between public health and privacy is adjusted during 
emergencies. In 2004, Congress provided the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) the authority to waive certain health regulatory 
requirements during times of national emergency.
85
 HHS, in turn, has 
issued waivers during several emergencies, such as Hurricanes Katrina, 
Harvey, Erma and Maria, and the 2017 California wildfires.
86
 Indeed, the 
recent HIPAA notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposes a “good 
faith belief” about an individual’s best interests in disclosing information 




Not surprisingly, therefore, in March 2020, and based on the current 
rules, HHS-OCR issued a limited waiver of HIPAA sanctions and penalties 
during the COVID-19 national emergency.
88
 This had the effect of waiving 
sanctions and penalties for failure to comply with the following HIPAA 
requirements: (1) to obtain a patient’s agreement to speak with family 
members or friends involved in the patient’s care; (2) to honor a request to 
opt-out of the facilities; (3) to distribute a notice of privacy practices; (4) to 
request privacy restrictions; and (5) to request confidential 
communications.
89
 This waiver, however, is limited to hospitals that have 
instituted a disaster protocol for up to seventy-two hours so that hospitals 
may focus on providing patient care during crises instead of being 
inundated with privacy-related paperwork.
90
 
                                                                                                             
 84. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HIPAA, HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGES, 
AND DISCLOSURES OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PURPOSES 1–3 
(Dec. 18, 2020).  
 85. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, § 9, 118 Stat. 835, 863–64 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 86. Emergency Situations: Preparedness, Planning and Response, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergency-
preparedness/index.html (last visited May 29, 2021).  
 87. See Proposed Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule to Support, and Remove 
Barriers to, Coordinated Care and Individual Engagement, supra note 24 (detailing 
NPRM’s efforts to strengthen HIPAA patient access and improve information sharing for 
care coordination and case management).  
 88. Waiver or Modification of Requirements Under Section 1135 of the Social Security 
Act, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY (Mar. 13, 2020),  https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/ 
healthactions/section1135/Pages/covid19-13March20.aspx. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., COVID-19 & HIPAA BULLETIN: 
LIMITED WAIVER OF HIPAA SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES DURING A NATIONWIDE PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCY 1 (Mar. 2020); see also Proposed Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy 
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In the weeks and months that followed, HHS-OCR issued additional 
FAQs, guidance, and notifications of enforcement discretion to prioritize 
information sharing (subject to the minimally necessary standard).
91
 Those 
provisions permitted providers to disclose PHI of those infected with or 
exposed to COVID-19 to first responders and PHAs;
92
 allowed the use of 
certain, less secure communications platforms for telehealth;
93
 permitted the 
unauthorized use and disclosure of PHI by business associates for public 
health activities;
94
 allowed the participation of covered entities (such as 
pharmacy chains) in community-based-testing sites (such as drive-through 
testing stations);
95
 and permitted contacting former patients with regard to 
                                                                                                             
Rule to Support, and Remove Barriers to, Coordinated Care and Individual Engagement, 
supra note 24 (discussing paperwork burdens). 
 91. See HIPAA and COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: HEALTH INFO. 
PRIVACY (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/hipaa-
covid19/index.html; see also Stacey Tovino, Professor of Law, Univ. of Okla. Coll. of Law, 
Address at the Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture, Tradeoffs: Technology, Privacy, and 
the Law (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/programs/childress-lecture.php 
(discussing prioritization and subordination of privacy rights).  
 92. OCR Issues Guidance to Help Ensure First Responders and Others Receive 
Protected Health Information About Individuals Exposed to COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/03/24/ocr-issues-
guidance-to-help-ensure-first-responders-and-others-receive-protected-health-information-
about-individuals-exposed-to-covid-19.html. 
 93. OCR Announces Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote 
Communications During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/03/17/ocr-
announces-notification-of-enforcement-discretion-for-telehealth-remote-communications-
during-the-covid-19.html; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FAQS ON TELEHEALTH 
AND HIPAA DURING THE COVID-19 NATIONWIDE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 4–5 (Mar. 
2020) (clarifying that health care providers may use popular apps, such as FaceTime or 
Skype, for telehealth appointments and patient communication while prohibiting the use of 
public facing communication apps such as Facebook Live, Twitch, and TikTok). 
 94. OCR Announces Notification of Enforcement Discretion to Allow Uses and 
Disclosures of Protected Health Information by Business Associates for Public Health and 
Health Oversight Activities During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/ 
2020/04/02/ocr-announces-notification-of-enforcement-discretion.html.  
 95. OCR Announces Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Community-Based 
Testing Sites During the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T 









 In January 2021, HHS-OCR announced enforcement 
discretion for violations of the HIPAA Rules in connection with the good-




HHS-OCR fine-tuned these re-calibrations to emphasize that there are 
some instances where the right to information sharing should be 
subordinated to individual privacy, particularly when it came to media 
access to patients’ PHI, which can invoke stigma and discrimination, and 
even subject patients to scams from bad actors.
98
  
Overall, however, this area provides a clear example of the hydraulic 
relationship between public health and data protection (privacy and 
security). As public health needs increased during the pandemic, HHS-OCR 
(minimally) recalibrated HIPAA rules in a slight shift away from health 
individualism privacy and toward public health solidarity to improve the 
overall health of the population. 
C. Clinical Trials, The Common Rule-HIPAA Construct, and IRB Waivers  
The public health consequences and economic concerns associated with 
the pandemic have ignited a need for medical research to create safe and 
effective treatments and vaccines. This imperative has illustrated the (often 
false) dichotomy between safety (which tends to emphasize regulation) and 
speedy access (which values innovation and individual choice) in moving 
treatments and vaccines from bench to bedside. For instance, since the 
beginning of the pandemic, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
been under intense pressure to approve
99
—or at the very least make 
                                                                                                             
 96. OCR Issues Guidance on How Health Care Providers Can Contact Former COVID-
19 Patients About Blood and Plasma Donation Opportunities, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (June 12, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/12/guidance-on-hipaa-
and-contacting-former-covid-19-patients-about-blood-and-plasma-donation.html. 
 97. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION REGARDING 
ONLINE OR WEB-BASED SCHEDULING APPLICATIONS FOR THE SCHEDULING OF INDIVIDUAL 
APPOINTMENTS FOR COVID-19 VACCINATION DURING THE COVID-19 NATIONWIDE PUBLIC 
HEALTH EMERGENCY (Jan. 2021). 
 98. OCR Issues Guidance on Covered Health Care Providers and Restrictions on 
Media Access to Protected Health Information About Individuals in Their Facilities, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (May 5, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/05/ 
ocr-issues-guidance-covered-health-care-poviders-restrictions-media-access-protected-
health-information-individuals-facilities.html (clarifying restrictions on disclosures to the 
media); see also Tovino, supra note 91. 
 99. Contrary to public opinion, the FDA has one of the fastest drug approval processes 
in the world, with drugs in the United States largely getting approval before they reach that 
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—investigational products for the prevention and treatment of 
COVID-19, including the botched attempt with hydroxychloroquine.
101
 To 
what extent do hydraulic relationships operate in the arena of drug 
development and approval? 
Obviously, giving access to investigational products, usually pursuant to 
an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA)
102
 is an example of a hydraulic 
                                                                                                             
stage in either Europe or Canada. See Benjamin N. Rome & Jerry Avorn, Drug Evaluation 
During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2282, 2283 (2020). 
 100. Over the last few decades, the FDA has increased the amount of expedited approval 
pathways, reformed its expanded access pathway, and allowed submission of real-world 
evidence and earlier surrogate endpoints to satisfy safety and efficacy standards. See id. at 
2283–84. Within the context of the pandemic, the FDA further implemented a special 
emergency acceleration pathway for SARS-COV-2: Coronavirus Treatment Acceleration 
Program (CTAP). See Coronavirus Treatment Acceleration Program (CTAP), U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/coronavirus-Sars-Cov-2-drugs/coronavirus-treat 
ment-acceleration-program-ctap (last visited May 29, 2021). 
 101. For example, political controversy ensued after the FDA granted (based on what 
some argued was inappropriate political pressure) then later revoked an Emergency Use 
Authorization (EUA) that allowed for chloroquine phosphate and hydroxychloroquine 
sulfate to be used to treat certain hospitalized patients. See Rome & Avorn, supra note 99, at 
2283; see also Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Revokes Emergency Use 
Authorization for Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 
15, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-
update-fda-revokes-emergency-use-authorization-chloroquine-and. Data now shows that 
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine are neither safe nor effective and can present fatal side 
effects, primarily affecting the heart muscle, causing changes in electrical activity or causing 
inflammation. See FDA Cautions Against Use of Hydroxychloroquine or Chloroquine for 
COVID-19 Outside of the Hospital Setting or a Clinical Trial Due to Risk of Heart Rhythm 
Problems, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-
safety-and-availability/fda-cautions-against-use-hydroxychloroquine-or-chloroquine-covid-
19-outside-hospital-setting-or. Indeed, a tragic consequence occurred after a couple in 
Arizona attempted to self-medicate with chloroquine phosphate, a related chemical 
compound that is used to treat fish for parasites, resulting in the death of the man. Kimberly 
Hickok, Husband and Wife Poison Themselves Trying to Self-Medicate With Chloroquine, 
LIVE SCI. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-chloroquine-self-
medication-kills-man.html. 
 102. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks, 
Congress provided the FDA the ability to issue an EUA whereby investigational medical 
products can be made available to patients in certain public health emergencies before the 
rigorous premarket approval process is completed. See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-276, § 4, 118 Stat. 835, 853–59 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.); see also Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda. 
gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/ 
emergency-use-authorization (last visited May 29, 2021). 
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relationship, albeit one between public health and drug safety.
103
 But EUAs 
(and the entire FDA pre-market approval process for investigational 
products) also depend upon obtaining comprehensive and accurate health 
data from human subjects in the clinical trial process.
104
 To an extent, 
therefore, the drug approval apparatus—and in particular the institutions 
that balance data protection, research protocols, and drug approval—
operate as a hydraulic process. 
As is well known, the many historic abuses conducted in the name of 
medical research (including, but certainly not limited to, atrocities from the 
Nazi medical experiments
105
 and the horrific Tuskegee Syphilis study
106
) 
resulted in stronger research standards for human experimentation. In the 
United States, the various research standards culminated in the “Common 
Rule,”
107
 which, in part, requires that Investigational Review Boards (IRBs) 
protect, to the extent possible, human subjects from risks associated with 
medical research.
108
 IRBs review research proposals to make sure they 
                                                                                                             
 103. The FDA will only issue an EUA where it is “reasonable to believe” that a treatment 
“may be effective” and the known benefits outweigh the risks. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED 
AUTHORITIES 7–8 (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-
guidance-documents/emergency-use-authorization-medical-products-and-related-authorities. 
 104. Outside the scope of this section are the additional complexities that exist when 
considering data protection for data about or affecting health that is not subject to HIPAA 
(but may be subject to other federal or state laws) because such data is held in or by mobile 
devices, fitness bands, big data brokers, the Internet of Things, etc. See Terry, Regulatory 
Disruption, supra note 4, at 179; Rothstein et al., supra note 43, at 196.  
 105. Allan Gaw, Beyond Consent: The Potential for Atrocity, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 
175, 175 (2006). 
 106. Id. 
 107. The Common Rule is the name used for HHS’s Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects. The term “Common Rule” was derived from the fact that fifteen different federal 
departments and agencies adopted nearly identical regulations to govern the protection of 
human subjects. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-
and-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html.  
 108. These horrific abuses did result in some stronger research standards, including the 
National Research Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, and the Belmont 
Report in 1979 that provided greater clarification on equitable policies for medical research, 
The Belmont Report, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 18, 1979), https://www. 
hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf. While the Belmont 
Report served as inspiration for the Common Rule, none of these legal tools engendered 
trust in medical research, particularly for people of color and vulnerable populations. Much 
still needs to be done—from making sure that clinical trials are sufficiently diverse to 
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protect participants’ welfare and rights, and that the research conducted is 
ethical.
109
 While privacy and confidentiality are considered, they were not 
initially the central focus of the Common Rule. HIPAA was designed to fill 
in the gaps with additional privacy protections associated with the use and 
disclosure of the research participants’ PHI.
110
 Thus, the Privacy Rule
111
 
allows covered entities to use PHI internally for research (regardless of 
funding or whether FDA regulates the research) or to disclose to outside 
researchers where certain circumstances or conditions are met.
112
  
Under the Privacy Rule, researchers generally must obtain a patient’s 
authorization for the use and disclosure of PHI for research purposes. 
However, the Privacy Rule provides flexibility for an IRB to waive or alter 
the authorization requirement in some situations, thereby enabling a 
covered entity to use or disclose PHI for research without a patient 
authorization.
113
 In order to waive or alter the authorization requirement, an 
                                                                                                             
verifying a just and equitable allocation of resources, such as vaccines and medications, for 
populations hit hardest by the pandemic. 
 109. See Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-
documents/institutional-review-boards-frequently-asked-questions. 
 110. See  U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., MEDICAL RECORD PRIVACY: ACCESS NEEDED FOR 
HEALTH RESEARCH, BUT OVERSIGHT OF PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IS LIMITED 13, 16 (Feb. 1999) 
(acknowledging that the Common Rule did not sufficiently address the issues of 
confidentiality and privacy in research settings). 
 111. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, § 
261, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021–31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 
U.S.C.). The Privacy Rule has subsequently been amended pursuant to the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233, § 105, 122 Stat. 881, 903–05 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the HITECH Act, Pub. L. 111-
5, §§ 13401–13411, 123 Stat. 226, 260–76 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). For most covered entities, compliance with the Privacy regulations was 
required as of April 14, 2003. Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T HEATH & HUM. SERVS. 
(Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/ 
enforcement-highlights/2014-april/index.html. 
 112. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2020) (detailing situations where PHI may be used or 
disclosed without permission of individuals). Note that section 164.512(b)(iii)(A) enables 
disclosure without authorization for adverse event reporting for clinical trial drug sponsors 
or others under the jurisdiction of the FDA. 
 113. See id. § 164.512(i). Waivers or alteration may also be done by a Privacy Board. 
However, even where the authorization requirement is altered or waived, the IRB has an 
express responsibility to protect research participants from risks under 45 C.F.R. part 46 
(HHS’s Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects) and 21 C.F.R parts 50 and 56 
(FDA regulations on the Protection of Human Subjects). In addition, other federal and state 
laws and regulations may impose other restrictions on the use of PHI that may not be waived 
or altered by an IRB or Privacy Board.  
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IRB (or Privacy Board) must determine that the disclosure could not be 
conducted without access to and use of the PHI or that the disclosure 
involves no more than a minimal risk.
114
 So, for example, an IRB may 
completely waive the authorization requirement where obtaining 
authorization is either impracticable or impossible, such as in the case 
where multiple research participants’ contact information is unknown.
115
 
Likewise, an IRB can also partially waive the authorization requirement in 
a situation where a researcher needs to obtain PHI to contact and recruit 
potential research subjects.
116
 An IRB may also alter the authorization 
requirement by eliminating a required element, such as the requirement to 
describe the purpose of the requested use or disclosure.
117
  
In addition to the dynamic calibration that comes from placing IRBs at 
the center of privacy-safety-research relationships, some more conventional 
hydraulics can also be identified. For example, the FDA issued a guidance 
in March 2020 permitting researchers to follow patients through the use of 
less secure telehealth platforms, as opposed to onsite testing.
118
 These 
virtual platforms ensured that clinical trials could continue at a robust clip 
during the pandemic and continue to generate useful data.
119
  
The relationship between the Common Rule and the Privacy Rule 
acknowledges that, although safeguards need to be provided to protect the 
privacy and confidentiality of PHI, when it comes to medical research, 
“[health data] is most useful when shared.”
120
 The Common Rule-Privacy 
                                                                                                             
 114. See id. § 164.512(i)(2). Minimal risk requires, at least, the presence of an adequate 
plan (1) to protect PHI identifiers from improper use and disclosure; (2) to destroy those 
identifiers at the earliest opportunity, unless otherwise required by law; and (3) adequate 
written assurances that the PHI will not be reused or disclosed to any other person or entity 
except required, authorized, or otherwise permitted. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)(1)–(3).  
 115. Institutional Review Boards and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS.: NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (July 8, 2004), https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/ 
irbandprivacyrule.asp.  
 116. Id. 
 117. See Clinical Research and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS.: NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (June 22, 2004), https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/clin_ 
research.asp. 
 118. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CONDUCT 
OF CLINICAL TRIALS OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS DURING COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
BOARDS 14–15 (Mar. 2020). 
 119. See id. 
 120. Douglas Peddicord et al., A Proposal to Protect Privacy of Health Information 
While Accelerating Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 2082, 2082–83 
(2010). 
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Rule construct thus is a recalibration, with health research given 
preferential treatment vis-à-vis privacy. And, by design, IRBs may fine-
tune this calibration in favor of research goals.  
D. Substance Use Confidentiality and the CARES Act 
As already noted with regard to the ACA and its prohibition of medical 
underwriting, privacy rules and antidiscrimination rules are capable of a 
powerful hydraulic relationship, suggesting that increasing the latter could 
justify reducing the former. This relationship is powerfully (if somewhat 
controversially) illustrated by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security (CARES) Act’s
121
 reform of The Confidentiality of Alcohol and 
Drug Abuse Patient Records regulations (commonly known as Part 2).
122
 
In addition to HIPAA Privacy, Part 2 provides a layer of confidentiality 
to the identity and records of Substance Abuse Disorder (SUD) patients. It 
applies to federally assisted programs that diagnose, treat, or refer SUD 
patients.
123
 However, that can include personnel or a unit within a general 
medical facility. Part 2 requires a detailed consent in writing from the 
patient for any sharing of records.
124
 The reason for the sharing and the 
identity of the recipient must be identified with specificity. In most cases 
redisclosure is prohibited, and the rules also impose limitations on how the 
recipient of the information can use and disclose the information.
125
 
Dating from the 1970s, Part 2 was enacted before any modern federal or 
state health data protections
126
 and is part of the history of segregated 
treatment of those with mental health or substance use needs. Part 2 
survived the passage of HIPAA and remains as an additional level of 
protection for substance use records. However, as substance use treatment 
became more mainstream and providers relied more on electronic health 
records (EHRs), Part 2 increasingly became controversial. Specifically, the 
                                                                                                             
 121. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-
136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). See generally Nicolas Terry, Melissa Goldstein & Kirk Nahra, 
COVID-19: Substance Use Disorder, Privacy, and the CARES Act, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG 
(June 8, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200605.571907/full/.  
 122. 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1–2.4 (2020); id. §§ 2.11–2.23; id. §§ 2.31–2.35; id. §§ 2.51–2.53; 
id. §§ 2.61–2.67. 
 123. Id. §§ 2.12(a)(1)(ii), (b). 
 124. See id. § 2.13. 
 125. See Substance Abuse Confidentiality Regulations, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.samhsa.gov/about-us/who-we-
are/laws-regulations/confidentiality-regulations-faqs.  
 126. Dennis McCarty et al., The Perceived Impact of 42 CFR Part 2 on Coordination 
and Integration of Care: A Qualitative Analysis, 68 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 245, 245 (2017). 
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dual regimes caused headaches for providers’ workflows while a frequent 
inability to add SUD records to an EHR hampered emergency department 
assessment, coordinated care, HIE data sharing, and SUD research based on 
EHR data.
127
 Countering these arguments have been very real concerns 




In recent years, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA) has updated Part 2 but resisted efforts to 
integrate it more fully with HIPAA, in large part because of limitations in 
the enabling statute.
129
 In 2019, HHS published a draft framework for a 
more fundamental reworking of Part 2.
130
 In July 2020, in what will 
probably be the final revision of the “old” Part 2, the rule was revised to 
“facilitate better coordination of care in response to the opioid epidemic 




By then, the future of Part 2 had already been written by the major 
changes introduced in March 2020 by CARES. Fundamental changes to 
Part 2’s enabling legislation will lead to fundamental changes to Part 2’s 
use and disclosure rules because they are aligned with the HIPAA 
standards. Indeed, after an initial, less rigorous consent to use and 
disclosure rules, the HIPAA rules will govern. HIPAA’s breach notification 
rule has also been extended to substance use records.
132
 
                                                                                                             
 127. See id. at 247–48 (discussing a group of state healthcare providers’ concerns about 
operating under both HIPAA and Part 2). 
 128. See, e.g., Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 
6052, 6053 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“The disclosure of records of 
individuals with substance use disorders has the potential to lead to a host of negative 
consequences, including: Loss of employment, loss of housing, loss of child custody, 
discrimination by medical professionals and insurers, arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration.”).  
 129. See, e.g., id. at 6060–61; see also Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient 
Records, 83 Fed. Reg. 239, 240 (Jan. 3, 2018) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2).  
 130. HHS 42 CFR Part 2 Proposed Rule Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/08/22/hhs-42-cfr-part-2-proposed-
rule-fact-sheet.html. 
 131. Fact Sheet: SAMHSA 42 CFR Part 2 Revised Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (July 13, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/07/13/fact-sheet-samhsa-42-
cfr-part-2-revised-rule.html; see Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 
85 Fed. Reg. 42986, 42986–87 (July 15, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2).  
 132. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-
136, § 3221(h), 134 Stat. 281, 378 (2020).  
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The ADA recognizes substance use as a qualifying disability.
133
 
However, its qualification regarding unlawful use
134
 has been at least one 
reason why Part 2’s more fervent supporters have viewed it as an 
inadequate antidiscrimination provision. In contrast, the CARES Act 
includes robust antidiscrimination provisions in an apparent attempt to 
balance out the privacy changes.
135
 These provisions prohibit discrimination 
“on the basis of information received . . . pursuant to an inadvertent or 
intentional disclosure of records, or information contained in [substance 
use] records.”
136
 The discrimination is prohibited in several domains, 




Needless to say, there are several variables in play here. The changes to 
Part 2 will require as yet unwritten regulations, while the true worth of the 
antidiscrimination provisions likely will depend on investigation and 
enforcement. Only when those pictures become clearer will we know 
whether the new relationship between substance use data protection and 
healthcare discrimination has been successfully recalibrated.  
IV. Conclusion 
This thought experiment had modest goals. We wanted to critically 
examine the existing relationship between the U.S. healthcare system and 
our health privacy system and reimagine how these systems may function if 
they were designed around principles of solidarity, rather than health 
individualism. As stated earlier, this is not an attempt to eliminate 
healthcare data protections. Health data are sensitive in nature and deserve 
exceptional protection because of their potential for enabling stigma and 
discrimination. Privacy protections have an intrinsic value in our existing 
healthcare system because they promote trust, which leads to information 
sharing and better health outcomes. But, like taxes, enhanced privacy 
protections are burdensome, costly, and can hinder medical innovation. We 
provided some examples of where laws, regulations, and practices were 
successfully calibrated to shed light on how a careful shift toward solidarity 
principles can create a hydraulic relationship between healthcare and health 
                                                                                                             
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b).  
 134. An individual that is “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs” is not a 
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. Id. § 12114(a). 
 135. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act § 3221(g). 
 136. Id. § 3221(g)(i)(1). 
 137. Id. 
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privacy, which would encourage information sharing in a way that benefits 
both clinical and public health. 
First, if our healthcare system evolves toward universal access and 
continues prohibiting health discrimination, such with the ACA’s protection 
of preexisting conditions, GINA, and the CARES Act’s robust 
antidiscrimination protections regarding substance abuse information, then 
the need for health data protection may decrease because exposure would 
become less consequential.  
Second, the pandemic has magnified many ugly truths about our 
healthcare system, including how emphasis on clinical health over public 
health has resulted in the outsized role of social determinants, zip-code 
health, and institutionalized health inequities. Much work needs to be done. 
However, strengthening avenues for information sharing that prioritize 
communication and information sharing (particularly as it relates to public 
health), such as regulations and guidance by HHS, OCR, and even the FDA 
during the pandemic is a good start. Likewise, changes to Part 2’s use and 
disclosure rules (although awaiting enabling legislation) to better coordinate 
care, and the flexibility given to IRB (or a Privacy Board) to waive 
authorization in certain circumstances are minimal, yet successful 
recalibrations, the underlying premise of which could be replicated in other 
areas of healthcare. 
And finally, when we have an opportunity to look back at the pandemic’s 
unnecessary death toll and begin the difficult task of rebuilding better, 
perhaps we can adopt a unified approach—one which considers our 
healthcare system in tandem with our health privacy system, and envisions 
how, if recalibrated in a manner that favors solidarity principles, each 
system could complement and improve each other, thereby completing a 
virtuous circle. 
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